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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Imagining socioecological transformation: An analysis 
of the Welsh Government’s policy innovations and 
orientations to the future
Anna Pigott
This article explores how the Welsh Government’s recent policy innovations in climate change and 
environmental sustainability can be read in terms of their imaginative capacity for transformation. The 
Welsh Government is one of only a few governments in the world to have a legal duty to sustainable 
development, which includes the pioneering Well-being of Future Generations Act (2015). The legislation 
has received international attention and praise from the United Nations but, as yet, the Welsh Government’s 
imaginaries of socioecological transformation have received little scrutiny regarding the kinds of ideas about 
the future and possibilities for change they set in motion. The article considers imaginaries as providing 
the very grounds of possibility for transformation, being comprised of stories and narratives about what 
kinds of futures are possible and desirable, intermingled with emotional-affective “atmospheres” that can 
promote or hinder people’s engagement with environmental issues. The article focuses on three aspects 
of the Welsh Government’s imaginaries related to socioecological transformation, namely; resilience and 
anticipatory discourse, linear time, and “conspiracies of optimism”. A number of tensions are drawn out 
that highlight how the Welsh Government’s seemingly progressive rhetoric risks being undermined by the 
conceptions of time and change it employs. Thus, the article contributes to wider critical analyses of how 
new politics and modes of governance of and for the (proposed) Anthropocene are taking shape.
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Introduction
The Welsh Government is one of only a few governments 
in the world to have a legal duty to sustainable develop-
ment (under the Government of Wales Act 2006, section 
79(6)) and it has recently introduced a pioneering Well-
being of Future Generations Act (2015). This legislation 
has received international attention and praise from 
the United Nations (UN), and the UN’s head of Sustain-
able Development, Nikhil Seth, announced in 2015 that 
“we hope that what Wales is doing today the world will 
do tomorrow”. The Welsh Government’s imaginaries of 
 socioecological transformation are therefore worthy of 
some closer scrutiny regarding the kinds of ideas and 
 possibilities for change they create and reproduce. 
Although the Welsh Government itself uses the term 
“sustainable development”, in this article I use the term 
“socioecological transformation” as a means for looking 
more broadly at the Government’s vision (of which the 
notion of sustainable development is a part). The term 
“socioecological transformation” is increasingly used to 
signify the kinds of wholesale changes—in thinking and 
practices—that are deemed necessary to address some 
of the most pressing environmental challenges of the 
21st Century (see, for example, Braun, 2015; Hawkins et 
al., 2015; Wainwright and Mann, 2015). As a concept it 
attempts to understand social and ecological realms as 
thoroughly interconnected, and the world as constantly 
changing and in flux, marked by non-equilibrium and 
 complexity (Zimmerer, 1994). In contrast, sustainable 
development, an earlier (and variously defined) para-
digm for addressing environmental problems, has been 
 criticized as a contradiction in terms, the emphasis on 
“development” a disguise for continued economic growth 
that rests on ideas about the environment as a relatively 
stable background “stock” of resources (Robinson, 2004; 
Holden, 2010). Thus, my intention is not to ask whether 
and how the Welsh Government is fostering sustainable 
development (because this is a highly contested term 
with regard to whether that is actually what is needed), 
but is rather to explore the ways in which the Welsh 
Government’s vision might foster (or not) some more 
fundamental socioecological transformations regarding 
the ways that people imagine and behave towards the 
environment.
In taking a broader socioecological perspective, 
the  article contributes to ongoing research into how 
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new politics and modes of governance of and for the 
Anthropocene (a proposed new geological epoch that 
is “functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the 
Holocene” (Waters et al., 2016 p. 137) are taking shape 
(e.g. Anderson, 2010; Wainwright and Mann, 2013; Braun, 
2014; Wakefield and Braun, 2014). While several  studies 
address the diffusion and implications of emerging envi-
ronmental legislation (e.g. Rayner and Jordan, 2013; 
Massey et al., 2014), fewer studies have focused on envi-
ronmental policy in terms of the kinds of socioecological 
imaginaries they set in motion (some exceptions include 
Braun, 2014 and Swyngedouw, 2010). To date, no studies 
have engaged specifically with the Welsh Government’s 
recent policy innovations in this regard, and as such this 
article provides a novel analysis of the Welsh Government’s 
activities, particularly in terms of their implications for 
the ways in which socioecological futures are imagined, 
enacted, and governed, and how this rebounds on how 
life unfolds in the present (Anderson and Adey, 2012). In 
what follows I describe how I have engaged with concepts 
of imagination and imaginaries and why these are useful 
for thinking about environmental policy. I then introduce 
the Welsh Government’s policy innovations, before mov-
ing onto the empirical sections of the article.
Conceptualizing imagination
Why approach environmental policy from the perspec-
tive of imagination? To answer this question, I begin from 
an understanding that imaginaries are not opposed to 
“the real” but rather, as Dawney (2011 p. 535) describes, 
imaginaries are “produced by bodies through practices 
and technologies and constitute the way in which we 
experience the world”. In this sense, imaginaries are “cen-
tral to an understanding of how bodies, individually and 
collectively, act on the world in order to manage affects, 
bring about change and in doing so produce subjects” 
(ibid.). I approach imagination as a “social faculty” (Stoet-
zler and Yuval-Davis, 2002 p. 325), which highlights 
how individual experience is situated in (and made pos-
sible by) a wider collective experience (Castoriadis, 1994; 
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002). This is especially relevant 
in relation to climate change, where competing imaginar-
ies formed from many intermingling sources (from scien-
tific reports to disaster movies, for example) combine to 
inform various impressions of “who we are and what we 
can become in times of climate change” (Sjögren, 2016 
p. 27). This is increasingly a position adopted in the lit-
erature, and in wider debates about climate (and other 
environmental) change, which argue not only that imagi-
nation matters for how societies respond to such issues, 
but also that it requires a concerted effort to understand 
and deconstruct current (ailing?) imaginaries of environ-
mental futures in order to reclaim new ones and disrupt 
hegemonic imaginaries that can make it difficult to imag-
ine alternatives (e.g. Hurley, 2008; Yusoff and Gabrys, 
2011; Levitas, 2013; Harris, 2017b). Thus, Appadurai (1996 
p. 4) sees imagination as a “space of contestation in which 
individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their 
own practices”. This is an important part of how fields 
of possibility delineate what people consider “possible 
and desirable to do, to know, to think, to feel, to dream 
at a certain point in time in a specific society” (Sjögren, 
2016 p. 26). Yusoff and Gabrys (2011 p. 516) also define 
 imagination “as a way of seeing, sensing, thinking, and 
dreaming that creates the conditions for material inter-
ventions in, and political  sensibilities of the world”. This 
material and political potential of imaginaries for trans-
formation is why I afford it central importance in this 
article as a way of approaching the Welsh Government’s 
practices and asking,  essentially, what kinds of “economies 
of affect and imagination”  (Rossiter, 2002 p. 84) they pro-
duce in relation to socioecological futures. More specifi-
cally, geographical imagination refers to ways of knowing 
and making sense of the world, a way of encompassing 
the known and the unknown in our understanding of the 
world (Massey 1994). In turn, such imaginaries can either 
limit or expand our perceived place in the world—be that 
as individuals, communities, nations, or as a species. As 
Beck writes, the “cultural ‘horizon’ of people’s expecta-
tions and values, born out of social experience and medi-
ated via cultural symbols, history, and material conditions, 
must be the main point of reference for understanding 
ecological concern” (Beck, 1995 p. 43). 
Storying and narrative are also important aspects of 
imagination, and a means through which imaginaries 
are structured. As Harris (2017a p. 647) contends, stories 
“matter in the traditional sense in that they are symbolic; 
they provide us with much needed motivation and orien-
tation. However, they also matter in the sense that they 
animate the world around us; they carry with them mate-
rial-discursive weight”. Collard et al. (2015 p. 327) there-
fore refer to stories as “practices [that] bring worlds into 
being; different stories enact different worlds that may be 
co-emergent, partially connected, or in conflict.” In addi-
tion, Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013 p. 2) suggest that 
stories and narratives are also how “people both analyze 
and realize personal relationships with land, animals, riv-
ers, air, and even bacteria.” From this perspective, it is pos-
sible to see why stories and narratives might be central to 
socioecological transformation, for they engage people’s 
capacities—individually and collectively—to speak into 
existence alternative worlds and ontologies (Blaser, 2010). 
Consequently, they “matter”, not only in the sense that 
they create meaning and are meaningful in people’s lives, 
but also in the sense of the “mattering” effect of stories; 
experiences of reality are created through the discursive 
privileging and processing of certain materials, and thus 
stories might be considered just as agential in relation to 
environmental crises as humans, rocks, and CO2, for exam-
ple (Barad, 2003; Harris, 2017b). Thus, environmental 
policy can be considered a major character in such stories, 
because policy shapes discourse by constraining and ena-
bling what can be said about what is possible or desirable, 
and by privileging the telling of some stories over others 
(Foucault, 2002; Barad, 2003).
Finally, the notion of “affective atmospheres” (Anderson, 
2009 p. 77) is also useful for conceptualizing imagination. 
Distinct (although deriving) from a physical science defi-
nition of “atmosphere” as a mixture of gases enveloping 
the earth, invisible and changeable, affective atmosphere 
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refers to the kind of “background hum” of conscious and 
unconscious factors that contribute to our experiences of 
the world (Thrift, 2004). These are the kinds of ambiences, 
moods, feelings, and tones which are central to our expe-
riences of the world but which we may be aware of only 
subliminally or tangentially. Affective atmospheres, as 
Anderson describes, are “intensities [which] may remain 
indefinite even as they effect. Perplexingly, the term atmos-
phere seems to express something vague. Something, an 
ill-defined indefinite something, that exceeds rational 
explanation and clear figuration. Something that hesi-
tates at the edge of the unsayable” (Anderson, 2009 p. 78). 
Affective atmospheres—like the air we breathe—provide 
the very conditions of possibility for life while simultane-
ously remaining more or less intangible (Anderson, 2009). 
Importantly, Dufrenne (1973) sees atmosphere as some-
thing of a collective consciousness that governs individual 
consciousness during times of change. In the context of 
this special issue, this is helpful for thinking about what 
imagination is and what its role might be in socioecologi-
cal transformation: in addition to understanding imagina-
tion as a cognitive skill to be developed or applied, the 
notion of atmosphere invites us to understand imagina-
tion as something more collective, consisting of shared 
affects, emotions, moods and tones which spread through 
and weave in and out of the tapestries of life. It is also use-
ful as a starting point for thinking about how the Welsh 
Government’s actions and language produce emotional 
and affective meaning (Jupp, Pykett, and Smith, 2016) and 
how these enable or disable imaginative capacities for 
transformation: what kinds of atmospheres make socio-
ecological transformation possible?
Although this conception of atmospheric imagination 
is rather vague and indeterminate, this is not to say that 
vague and indeterminate atmospheres are not impor-
tant, for they exert forces on life in important ways. The 
atmosphere of a particular place or event, as we all will 
have experienced, can profoundly influence our moods, 
thoughts, and emotions. Such indeterminacy does, how-
ever, present challenges in terms of using an “atmospheric 
lens” to consider an empirical case study. It is not possible 
to measure an affective atmosphere, and often not even 
possible to translate an atmosphere into words. Moreover, 
the ways in which an atmosphere is felt and experienced 
differs between people—if, indeed, we are conscious of it 
at all. My aim in this paper is therefore to draw attention 
to some key themes in the Welsh Government’s approach 
that provide clues as to some of the particular atmospheric 
“moods” gathering around socioecological transformation 
in its rhetoric. The empirical materials presented here are 
perhaps best thought of as proxies for the atmospheric 
conditions which I aim, with help from social theory, to 
elucidate. As such, I have chosen to focus on the Welsh 
Government’s imaginaries and stories—and the ideas 
about socioecological transformation they convey—rather 
than focus on its measurable “impacts”. This is because, as 
Gerlach (2017 p. 15) puts it, “given the desperation of the 
late Holocene, societies need to intensify the experimen-
tal tenacity of ideas”, and with this there is a need to criti-
cally engage with the “affective lives” (ibid. p. 11) of these 
ideas in terms of the kinds of socioecological futures they 
make possible. Such an analysis is, essentially, the task I 
have set myself in this article. In what follows I introduce 
the Welsh Government and outline why such an approach 
is relevant for an analysis of its policy innovations on envi-
ronment, sustainability, and well-being.
Overview of the Welsh Government’s approach
Wales is a small nation with big ambitions. It has a popula-
tion of just over 3 million people and is known, amongst 
other things, for its rugged coastlines and mountains, an 
emphasis on bilingualism (Welsh and English have equal 
status), a proud rugby tradition, and its role in the indus-
trial revolution from the 18th century onwards: from 
copper to coal and slate, Wales was a powerhouse of pro-
duction and its ports bustled with trade. Industrial and 
economic decline in the late 20th century—particularly 
after the collapse of the mining industries in the 1970s 
and 80s—has created high levels of unemployment and 
poverty in relation to the rest of the UK (Joseph  Rowntree 
Foundation 2015, 2016). Given these pressures, the Welsh 
Government’s decision to include legislation on sustain-
able development as part of the the Government of Wales 
Act (1998, section 121) demonstrated considerable fore-
sight and ambition. This legislative move was influenced 
by a range of global developments on sustainability 
around the same time, namely the Brundtland Commis-
sion’s coining of the term “sustainable development” in 
1987, the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio Earth Summit) in 1992, and the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1997 which saw sustainable develop-
ment become part of the legal framework of the European 
Union. The Welsh Government’s legislative commitment 
was strengthened in the subsequent Government of Wales 
Act) (2006, section 79) which made sustainable develop-
ment a statutory duty of the Welsh Government, and in 
2009 the One Wales: One Planet Sustainable Development 
Scheme (OWOP) of the Welsh Assembly Government con-
firmed that sustainable development would be the central 
organizing principle of its administration. It remains one 
of just a few administrations in the world to have done 
so, and indeed this is often referred to as a key part of 
Wales’s “distinctiveness” in its devolution journey. OWOP 
(2009 p. 17) states that its vision of a sustainable Wales is 
one where Wales:
•	 lives	within	its	environmental	limits,	using	only	its	fair	
share of the earth’s resources so that our ecological 
footprint is reduced to the global average  availability 
of resources, and we are resilient to the impacts of 
climate change;
•	 has	 healthy,	 biologically	 diverse	 and	 productive	
 ecosystems that are managed sustainably;
•	 has	a	 resilient	and	sustainable	economy	that	 is	able	
to develop whilst stabilizing, then reducing, its use 
of natural resources and reducing its contribution to 
 climate change;
•	 has	 communities	 which	 are	 safe,	 sustainable,	 and	
attractive places for people to live and work, where 
 people have access to services, and enjoy good health;
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•	 is	 a	 fair,	 just	 and	bilingual	nation,	 in	which	 citizens	
of all ages and backgrounds are empowered to deter-
mine their own lives, shape their communities and 
achieve their full potential. 
In 2015, the Welsh Government’s stance on sustainability 
was cemented through the introduction of a pioneering 
Well-being of Future Generations Act (2015) (WFGA). The 
Act places a duty on all public services in Wales to act in 
accordance with a set of “Well-being Goals”, and has been 
accompanied, and shaped, by a nation-wide consultation 
exercise called The Wales We Want, involving around 7000 
people. Public communication about the Act provided in 
the document Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) 
Act: The Essentials, states that the Act:
is about improving the social, economic, environ-
mental and cultural well-being of Wales. It will 
make public bodies think more about the long-
term, work better with people and communities 
and each other, look to prevent problems and take 
a more joined-up approach. This will help us to cre-
ate a Wales that we all want to live in, now and in 
the future. To make sure we are all working towards 
the same vision, the Act puts in place seven well-
being goals. (Department for Natural Resources of 
the Welsh Government, 2015 p. 3)
The Welsh Government’s vision can be considered an 
ambitious one for a number of key reasons. First, its 
stated aim to reduce the country’s ecological footprint 
to a  globally sustainable 1.88 global hectares per per-
son, within the lifetime of this generation, appears to 
 acknowledge the scale of transformation in western 
lifestyles that is required compared to current rates of 
 consumption. Second, the cross-party nature of the WFGA 
and its acknowledgement of long-term needs in its “ways 
of working” (see Department for Natural Resources of the 
Welsh Government, 2015 p. 7) is an attempt to challenge 
and avoid the pitfalls of transient four-to-five year politi-
cal cycles. Third, through a focus on future generations, it 
promotes a notion of  “intergenerational solidarity” which 
has recently been the subject of a United Nations report 
(2013) and recommendations. Only a handful of coun-
tries currently have national institutes or commissioners 
for future generations (Wales and Hungary have perhaps 
the most comprehensive of these, while several other 
 governments have constitutional  references to future 
generations in one form or another).1 Fourth, the Welsh 
 Government’s stated aim to take an integrated, “joined-
up” approach to  sustainability appears to respond to calls 
for  systems-thinking in response to socioecological prob-
lems (see, for example, the agenda of the new Future Earth 
initiative which is a collaboration between the UN Envi-
ronment Program, UNESCO, the International Council of 
Science, the International Social  Science Council, and the 
 Belmont Forum2). Its merging of the environmental, social, 
and economic legs of the classic  sustainability “stool” to 
form seven  Well-being Goals  (Figure1) is emblematic of 
this integrative approach. It is worth  noting here that 
although the Welsh  Government’s  climate change targets 
correspond to UK and international frameworks, they 
are perhaps the least ambitious component of the Welsh 
Government’s vision: its commitment to 3% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions per year relative to 2011 fall sig-
nificantly short of the 6–9% annual reductions deemed 
necessary to avoid extremely dangerous  warming of 2 
degrees  Celsius or more  (Anderson and Bows, 2008).
Figure 1: The Well-Being Goals of the Welsh Government. A graphic representation of the Well-Being Goals of 
the Well-being of Future Generations Act (Wales) 2015. This is the image used in most public communications about 
the Act. Source: Well-Being of Future Generations: The Essentials (Department for Natural Resources of the Welsh 
Government 2015, 3). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.315.f1
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Although unique, these policy innovations have not 
emerged out of a vacuum, and reflect some broader, 
international developments in socioecological trans-
formation. The United Nations (UN), for example, have 
promoted debate and issued guidance on the theme of 
intergenerational solidarity in its Secretary General’s 
report on Intergenerational Solidarity and Future 
Generations (2013). The Welsh Government’s national 
consultation exercise, The Wales We Want, also echoes 
the UN’s The World We Want web platform that seeks, 
as it states, to “build a collective vision that will be used 
directly by the United Nations and World Leaders to plan 
a new development agenda launching in 2015, one that is 
based on the aspirations of all citizens!.” In addition, the 
Welsh Government’s decision to use Well-being Goals as a 
framework for the Act mirrors the UN’s own Sustainable 
Development Goals. The intention that the Act should 
provide an overarching framework for public governance 
in Wales is also consistent with the “process-outcomes” 
model recommended by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) for embedding 
sustainable development within government (see Davies, 
2017 p. 167). Finally, the Welsh Government is a key 
member of the Regional Governments for Sustainable 
Development Network (a support and sharing network 
for subnational and regional governments that are work-
ing on sustainability transformations), which it helped 
found in 2002, and for which it acted as vice-president 
between 2015–2017. In April 2015, this involved the 
Welsh Government hosting academics, lawyers, human 
rights specialists, civil society organizations, senior UN 
officials, youth representatives, and representatives of 
national institutions for an international conference that 
responded to the aforementioned UN Secretary General’s 
report on Intergenerational Solidarity and Future 
Generations (2013). In this sense, the Welsh Government 
might be thought of as creating a “transformative niche” 
(Moore et al., 2014 p. 5) where policy innovations can be 
tested and developed, but which has wider relevance for 
approaches to socioecological transformation, not only 
in terms of the kinds of actions taken, but also in terms 
of the ideas it promotes. What becomes of the WFGA, is 
therefore, of intense interest not only to other nations 
and governments considering similar approaches, but 
also for those of us concerned with how new forms of 
governance are emerging in response to socioecological 
crises. 
However, due to the relative newness of the Act, there 
has so far been very little academic scrutiny of it (or 
indeed, of the Welsh Government’s approach to socioeco-
logical transformation more generally). Existing research 
(the work of one author), focuses on the legal implications 
of the Act, and its potential to effect the kinds of changes 
it aspires to. Davies’s (2016, 2017) work is instructive in 
this regard. He finds that, despite a language of “must” 
and “shall” and “duties” (2017 p. 171), the Act itself has 
relatively few “teeth” when it comes to enforcement. As 
Davies points out, the Act is very much couched in “exhor-
tatory rather than mandatory terms” (ibid.), and its effi-
cacy will depend mainly upon the Future Generation 
Commissioner’s (FGC) and the Auditor General’s abilities 
to hold public bodies to account (via a process of report-
ing to the National Assembly once every four years), and 
the political will and personalities of those people. In addi-
tion, the budget for the office of the FGC (which oversees 
the implementation of the Act) is relatively small, at £1.46 
million per annum, a figure that, as Davies (2017 p. 175) 
says, “is smaller even than the budget for the Children’s 
Commissioner for Wales, despite the fact that the [Future 
Generations Commissioner] is overseeing the ‘central 
organizing principle’ of Welsh governance”. Given these 
constraints, the power of the Act will depend largely on the 
ability of the office of the FGC and the Welsh Government 
to persuade public bodies to  co-operate. Therefore, what 
it is asking people to do—that is, the vision and aspira-
tion for the nation that it is asking people to join—is cen-
tral. Interestingly, despite a common refrain that “actions 
speak louder than words”, given the Act’s lack of legal 
power it might be that words are, in fact, its most powerful 
element, with the potential to shape people’s imaginar-
ies about possible and desirable futures. This discursive 
power can influence the forms that socioecological trans-
formation takes, and warrants close attention because 
the Welsh Government’s rhetoric about the WFGA (and 
related policies such as the Environment (Wales) Act 2016) 
form a “grand, regional narrative” (Murphy, 2013 p. 131) 
about what’s possible. It is also important because—as 
Nikhil Seth’s comment in the introduction to this article 
implies—there is international interest in what the Welsh 
Government is saying. 
In what follows I draw on document analysis, in-depth 
interviews with key government staff, and observational 
material from events and workshops during the period 
2013–2015. The main body of the article focuses on 
three key themes. The first of these discusses the concept 
of “resilience” as it features in the Welsh Government’s 
approach; the second explores the ways in which time 
is imagined and constructed; and the third section 
 section explores the possibility that some of the Welsh 
Government’s imaginaries of the future amount to “con-
spiracies of optimism” (Hirt, 1996). The final two sections 
examine some contradictions and tensions apparent in 
the Welsh Government’s approach to socioecological 
transformation, particularly with regard to balancing a 
values-based approach with a need for new and imagina-
tive ideas about time and change.
Resilience and anticipation
Sustainable development provides us with the 
route to developing a sustainable and strong 
economy that operates within environmental and 
financial limits, which meets the needs of all our 
citizens now and in the future, and is resilient to 
future change (One Wales: One Planet, 2009 p. 5)
A resilient Wales: A nation which maintains 
and enhances a biodiverse natural environment 
with healthy functioning ecosystems that sup-
port social, economic and ecological resilience 
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and the capacity to adapt to change (for exam-
ple  climate change). (Goal 3 of the Well Being of 
Future  Generations Act, Department for Natural 
Resources of the Welsh Government, 2015 p. 6)
Resilience emerges as a key framing in the Welsh 
 Government’s approach to the future, as the two extracts 
above highlight. This is perhaps not surprising: resilience 
is a notion which has taken off over the past several years 
and can be found in a whole host of political discourses, 
practices and academic debates (Pugh, 2014), particularly 
in relation to climate change and adaptation, in regional 
right through to global contexts (O’Hare and White, 2013). 
Resilience theorists use the term to describe a system’s 
capacity to absorb disturbance and undergo transforma-
tion (by way of self-organization, learning and adapta-
tion) so that it may retain essentially the same function 
( Holling, 1973), or transform into a new system (Walker 
and Salt, 2006), and accordingly it has become a popular 
concept amongst many scholars thinking about sustain-
ability transitions (e.g. Pelling, 2010; Folke et al., 2010; 
Walker and Cooper, 2011; Biggs et al., 2012). The term 
has also been adopted by several international platforms 
working in this field, such as the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre (http://www.stockholmresilience.org/), the Resil-
ience Alliance (https://www.resalliance.org/), and Future 
Earth (http://www.futureearth.org/). In my analysis, how-
ever, I engage with some of the critical literature around 
the concept of resilience because the ways in which the 
Welsh Government deploy the concept seem to diverge 
somewhat from how “resilience” is generally intended by 
many resilience scholars (and how it is intended in this 
special issue). Indeed, resilience—like sustainability—often 
remains a notoriously vague and fuzzy term in public use, 
mobilized in a broad variety of agendas. For example, the 
Welsh Government’s publications and communications 
regarding sustainability are peppered with the word “resil-
ience”, but little is offered in the way of a definition or 
specific applications. This ambiguity is often key to the 
term’s apparent success; it can be passively received as a 
broadly helpful concept “upon which a host of strategies 
may converge to help society and cities better prepare for 
a range of risks” (O’Hare and White, 2013 p. 275). Resil-
ience names a seemingly positive future (after all it seems 
counter-intuitive to argue that we should not become 
more resilient to potential shocks or stresses) and yet it 
makes no promises (Simon and Randalls, 2016).
Nonetheless, Simon and Randalls (2016) maintain that 
there is, at least, one theme of commonality across the 
diverse ways in which resilience is engaged with, and that 
is a certain notion of flexibility. In one sense this feels 
appropriate: the postmodern era has been characterised 
by conditions of uncertainty, accelerating change and 
complex, perpetually-in-flux global circumstances (e.g. 
Bauman, 2000; Tomlinson, 2007). Bauman (2000) uses 
the term “liquid modernity” to describe these conditions 
of fluidity, constantly changing circumstances, and a pro-
pensity for flexibility and mobility. Under such conditions, 
resilience seems to offer a tempting tool with which to 
stay afloat and navigate this perpetual change, a way of 
shifting with the sands, rather than being swallowed up 
by them. As Simon and Randalls (2016, 4) point out “resil-
ience is being offered as the solution to incredibly chal-
lenging societal problems and a key organizing concept in 
the zeitgeist of uncertainty”. 
At the same time, however, the notion of resilience can 
be used to infer a certain sense of standing still, of endur-
ing and staying put. The risk is that when the resilience 
discourse is used to this effect, it can imply that there 
is something about the conditions of the present that 
ought to be protected and preserved. Indeed, in contrast 
to social movements which welcome radically different 
futures that genuinely surprise, anticipatory politics aim 
to ensure that “no bad surprise happens” (Anderson, 2010 
p. 782). While this might indeed be desirable in terms of 
seeking to avoid potentially catastrophic effects of climate 
change, and maintaining Holocene-like conditions, it is 
not so useful if resilience serves as a concept with which 
to preserve a different kind of status quo—that is, the 
political, economic and social arrangements which are 
creating socioecological crises in the first place (e.g. White 
and O’Hare, 2014; Gillard, 2016). If resilience implies the 
ability to “field”, “absorb” or “bounce” back from extreme 
events in such a way that life can go on as before (Braun, 
2014 p. 56), then Walker and Cooper (2011) suggest that 
there is an “ideological fit” between this co-option of resil-
ience thinking and neoliberal philosophies. As MacKinnon 
and Derickson (2013 p. 254) write, “resilient spaces are 
precisely what capitalism needs—spaces that are periodi-
cally reinvented to meet the changing demands of capi-
tal accumulation an increasingly globalized economy”. 
From this perspective, socioecological transformation 
and resilience seem to be quite at odds with one another, 
because resilience be-gets responses to the environmental 
predicament that are organized within the horizons of a 
liberal-capitalist order (Swyngedouw, 2013). The concern 
is that, despite the potential of resilience to usher in new 
ways of thinking about human-environment relations in 
terms of complexity, non-linearity and non-equilibrium 
(Gillard, 2016), in practice resilience, depending on how 
it mobilized, can serve to ensure that the neoliberal order 
survives somewhat longer. Worse still, the “fuzziness” 
and ambiguity of the concept of resilience risks conflat-
ing neoliberal hegemony with ecological sustainability. I 
single out neoliberal capitalism here because there is an 
increasingly compelling case that this particular economic 
system (and the ideologies which sustain it) has been at 
the heart of ecological degradation since the industrial 
revolution, and will continue to be pivotal to how socioec-
oloigcal transformations transpire in the 21st Century (for 
better or for worse) (e.g. Smith, 1984; Harvey, 1996; Kallis, 
2011; Klein, 2015; Moore, 2015). As Jones (2009 p. 300) 
puts it, new forms of capitalism are “denuding cultural, 
psychological, and ecological diversity to the extent that 
we are witnessing ‘ecocide’ on a global scale.” Thus, the 
complicity of some uses of resilience in continuing neo-
liberal practices is something that needs to be challenged. 
The Welsh Government’s use of terms such as “build-
ing resilience” and “[becoming] more resilient to the con-
sequences of climate change impacts” also feed into a 
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corresponding narrative that enacts the future as a threat. 
For example, the OWOP agenda (2009 p. 14) states that 
“climate change threatens the basic elements of life for 
people around the world—access to water, food produc-
tion, health, and use of land—it also threatens our wider 
environment”. As Anderson (2010) contends, across many 
domains of life the future is problematized as a disruption 
or surprise, something to be preempted and prepared for, 
with liberal democracies forging atmospheres of antici-
pation in relation to the future. Groves (2016) suggests 
that the future thus becomes charged with emotion and 
affect—it is not simply anticipated, but anticipated with 
anxiety. The resilience concept is thus tightly bound to 
the idea that we now live in a “time of crisis” (Simon and 
Randalls, 2016 p. 3), and this has implications for the ways 
in which futures are disclosed, related to, and governed. 
For example, Braun (2015) suggests that there has been 
a shift in the ways in which the future has been related 
to (at least in Western cultures), describing how whereas 
“in modernism time was seen to flow from the present to 
the future, today we increasingly experience time coming 
towards us, from the future to the present” (Braun, 2015 
p. 239). Beck (1999) has characterized today’s prolifera-
tion of anticipatory actions as a “world risk society”, and 
points out that today’s risks are calculated in relation to 
what is essentially unknown about the future, as opposed 
to the pre-modern known dangers (such as famine and 
plague) that would have haunted the lives of people in 
the past. This marks a significant shift from a situation in 
which dangers were understood as strokes of fate, attrib-
utable to Gods or Nature, to a far more politically charged 
context in which today’s “risks” are intimately linked with 
human decision-making, accountability and responsibil-
ity, and which are often global in their scope. The con-
cept of the Anthropocene, and associated ideas such 
as planetary boundaries and safe operating spaces, are 
often associated with narratives of resilience and security 
(Randalls, 2015), and the reconfiguration of  public life 
around temporal registers of uncertainty, adjustment and 
repair (Barnett, 2015). Alongside a consensual setting in 
which environmental problems are staged as universally 
threatening, the contemporary condition is one woven 
through with fear and danger, creating “ecologies of fear” 
(Swyngedouw, 2013 p. 3; Neocleous, 2012). Following 
Badiou (2008), Swyngedouw argues that this mobilization 
of the future as a universal threat is a kind of opium for the 
masses, whereby “the nurturing of the promise of a more 
benign retrofitted climate (“resilience”) exhausts the hori-
zon of our aspirations and imaginations” (Swyngedouw, 
2013 p. 3).
Framing the future in terms of threat and resilience 
therefore risks legitimizing particular kinds of govern-
ance and knowledge production, conditioning how the 
future can be intervened into, by whom, and with what 
objects of concern in mind. With regards to the Welsh 
Government, a host of measures, registers, apprehensions, 
engagements and movements are involved in making the 
future present through anticipation. For example, the 
WBFG Act (2015) requires Assembly Ministers to produce 
a Future Trends Report twelve months before an Assembly 
election. The report includes predictions of likely trends in 
social,  economic and environmental indicators in Wales. 
The Welsh Government states that:
It’s important that we understand the challenges 
that we will be facing, and have a clear picture of 
where we are heading. (Department for Natural 
Resources of the Welsh Government, 2015 p. 10).
In addition, it has devised a suite of National Indicators 
(46 in total) in order to measure progress towards the 
Well-being Goals. Ministers set milestones in order to 
establish expectations and chart progress. Thus, by enact-
ing the future as a threat, and resilience as an appropriate 
response, knowledge about the future becomes a valuable 
asset—anticipation is the name of the game (and this is 
itself in conflict with principles of non-linearity, uncer-
tainty and emergence stipulated by resilience theorists). 
This desire to know the future (as though it is already 
determined) might therefore have the effect of overshad-
owing an imaginative capacity for transformation, and 
a belief that the future might be otherwise (Prigogine, 
2003). The (then) Future Generations Commissioner for 
Wales demonstrated this tension when he told me in 2015 
that:
… corporate organizations undertake risk assess-
ments in terms of what are the risks that the organ-
ization is facing–and in some respects for me the 
Future Trends Report is part of our risk assessment 
as to, you know, what are the external factors that 
are going to be impinging upon our ability to, you 
know, create the Wales … we want. Some of which 
we can work with, positively, as opportunities, but 
some of which are trends or things that happen to 
be managed and that we have to build resilience 
… to respond to.
The Welsh Government’s framing of sustainability trans-
formations in terms of risk-management also reflects 
a wider tendency to reduce climate imaginaries to 
cost/benefit-style analyses (e.g. Shaw and Nerlich 2015), 
a kind of “climate reductionism” (Hulme, 2011 p. 245) 
which focuses predominantly on impact and prediction 
rather than on more imaginative accounts of social life 
and visions of the future. This particular gaze on tomor-
row can permit recasting future social and environmen-
tal issues as techno-managerial issues of today, with sci-
ence and technology held up as keys to adaptation and 
resilience. In the course of such reductionism, the prob-
lem (which, in reality is complex, nebulous, and messy) 
appears to crystalize around particular objects of concern. 
In what Beck (2010 p. 263) calls the “technocratic iron 
cage of environmental politics”, CO2 is the “thing” around 
which which environmental dreams, aspirations, and poli-
cies crystalize  (Swyngedouw, 2013). Similarly, the Welsh 
Government’s focus on risk-calculation, self-assessment, 
quantification and bench-marking of performance, risk 
keeping climate politics as an “elitist and expert discourse” 
(Beck, 2010 p. 254), removed from the lives of most 
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people. This conflation of resilience with anticipatory 
politics also risks undermining the Welsh Government’s 
efforts to engage citizens, as it has tried to do through its 
The Wales We Want National Conversation (see Cynnal 
Cymru/Sustain Wales 2015).
As mentioned, resilience, on the face of things, is a 
difficult notion to find fault with, as it points to a vague 
yet seemingly optimistic aim (White and O’Hare, 2014). 
And yet it is precisely this “common sense”, consensual, 
framing which is questionable in terms of its imagina-
tive capacities for transformation. Nordmann (2014), for 
example, argues that “if we think of the future as some-
thing to be anticipated, expected, prepared, or braced for, 
and, at best, modulated as it comes upon us, we postu-
late ourselves as fundamentally unfree with respect to 
the future” (Nordmann, 2014 p. 93). In contrast, he sug-
gests that an ability to “freely envision a future world that 
accords to our values and needs” (ibid.) is what is needed 
in order to break the mold of anticipation which repro-
duces neoliberal horizons, allowing us to judge scenarios 
according to desirability rather than inevitability. This is 
not to deny that, as with everything, there are particular 
path dependencies and historical contexts which shape 
and constrain the Welsh Government’s response. It would 
be unreasonable to expect it to come up with entirely 
“free” and unbounded future imaginaries. But equally, it 
is important to remember, as Prigogine (2003) reminds 
us, that the future is not entirely given, either, and this is 
an imaginative possibility that the resilience discourse—if 
co-opted in the ways it appears to have been in the Welsh 
Government’s approach—risks closing down.
Trajectories of time
A second aspect of the Welsh Government’s approach, 
and in many ways related to resilience and anticipation, 
has to do with the shape of the future and how trajec-
tories of time and change are imagined and represented. 
The  predictive orientation of the Welsh Government’s 
anticipatory politics entails a linear conception of time 
(Inayatullah, 1993), and this is reinforced by a tendency 
to employ language which underpins a sense of forward 
motion. As already mentioned, the WFGA is founded 
on seven well-being “goals”, and the legislation includes 
language of “milestones” and “future trends” reports. In 
addition, the Welsh Government frequently refers to its 
legislation in terms of a “journey”. For example, “[T]his 
Strategy is a critical step on a journey to meeting that big-
ger challenge” (Climate Change Strategy for Wales, Welsh 
Assembly Government 2010, p. 3) and “the road to achiev-
ing the vision” (e.g. OWOP, 2009). Phrases such as “work-
ing towards” (WFGA, 2015 p. 3) and “route map” (OWOP, 
2009 p. 9) are also indicative of a particular way of relating 
to the future. 
One of the most striking aspects of the idea of being 
on a journey is the notion of collectivity (and consensus) 
attached to it. For example, public communication about 
the Act (WFGA, 2015 p. 3) states “To make sure we are all 
working towards the same vision, the Act puts in place 
seven well-being goals”, and, in a video about the Act3—
featuring protagonist Megan—the closing lines announce 
“This is the Wales that Megan wants. It’s the Wales we all 
want” (emphasis added). One government official involved 
with the formation of the Act told me, in 2015, that the 
language around goals and collective visions was chosen 
to align with the language and framing used by the United 
Nations, both in terms of its Sustainable Development 
Goals and its The World We Want web platform which 
states that “we will bring the priorities of people from 
every corner of the world to the forefront and help build 
a collective vision”. A potential problem with this kind of 
forward-facing, consensual framing is that it leaves little 
room for the articulation of divergent, conflicting, or radi-
cally alternative trajectories. As Swyngedouw (2013 p. 6) 
notes, “disagreement is allowed, but only with respect to 
the choice of technologies, the mix of organizational fixes, 
the detail of the managerial adjustments, and the urgency 
of their timing and implementation, not with respect to 
the socio-political framing of present and future natures.” 
Consequently, the Welsh Government, although attempt-
ing to engage people in a collective vision, may risk depo-
liticizing them because there is very little room for its 
vision to be contested or alternatives articulated.
The idea of progress and a sense of moving forward 
towards the future are also part of a particularly Modern 
imaginary—the Modern era is often defined by an orien-
tation to the future which is invested with a collective 
sense of purpose and improvement, a sense of leaving the 
past behind. Empowering visions of the future are central 
to such an imaginary. Indeed, following various diagno-
ses of contemporary societies being marked by a loss of 
utopian thought about the future, and therefore a fading 
of any belief that there could be any alternative, many 
have argued that a resurgence of the utopianism of the 
modern era is necessary (e.g. Harvey, 2000; Levitas, 2013). 
Proponents of so-called Green Modernity (e.g. Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger, 2007) urge that aspirations for contin-
uous improvement, innovation, novelty and progress are 
precisely the aspects of the Modern project which must 
be held on to if we are to have any hope of mobilizing 
the political and social will (and energy) to transform to 
more sustainable arrangements. As Latour (2008) con-
tends, the thrusting-forward arrow of time towards a pic-
ture of an attractive future, and its associated emotions of 
enthusiasm, frontier spirit and optimism, is unparalleled 
in its ability to unlock political passions, and to develop a 
politics of possibility necessary for overcoming the depo-
liticizing effect of doom and gloom environmentalism. 
Now is the time “to develop, not withdraw” says Latour 
(2008 p. 13). Hebdige (1993 p. 278) adds that although 
the metaphor of the journey is “the most trite, overused, 
banal metaphor imaginable for the way we move through 
time”, it is undeniably powerful as a focus for collective 
as well as personal identification within historical nar-
ratives. The Welsh Government appears very much to 
be buying into this sentiment. Indeed, its depictions of 
desirable future goals to aim for seem to want to defy the 
shifting sands of these times and to regain some sense 
of the apparent stability of earlier Modernity. In such a 
stance towards the future, Inayatullah (1993 p. 242) sug-
gests, “humans are not left alone wondering aimlessly in 
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a universe that has no certainty”. Linear time is, accord-
ing to Bauman, an imaginary more hospitable to life as a 
pilgrim, that is, orderly, predictable, determined, ensured. 
And even though he argues such a life is no longer fea-
sible in today’s “liquid-modern” world (Bauman, 2000), 
it nonetheless remains an attractive narrative. Bauman 
(1996 p. 22) describes how:
Pilgrimage is what one does of necessity, to avoid 
being lost in a desert; to invest the walking with a 
purpose while wandering the land with no destina-
tion. Being a pilgrim, one can do more than walk—
one can walk to. One can look back at the foot-
print left in the sand and see them as a road. One 
can reflect on the road past and see it as progress 
towards, an advance, a coming closer to; one can 
make a distinction between “behind” and “ahead”, 
and plot the “road ahead” as a succession of foot-
prints yet to pockmark the land without features. 
Destination, the set purpose of life pilgrimage’s, 
gives form to the formless, makes a whole out of 
the fragmentary, lends continuity to the episodic. 
(Emphasis in original)
Ideas of continuous development, progress, innovation 
and a sense of limitless human potential fuelled the rise 
of modern industrial-capitalist societies, and this way of 
relating to the future (as though it where “empty” and ours 
for the taking (Adam and Groves, 2007) has a complex 
range of emotions and affects associated with it (Latour, 
2008), ranging from a hopeful, utopian drive to improve 
society and the belief in a better world, to a preoccupation 
with unfettered growth and feelings of perpetual craving. 
Indeed, in the same way that the fuzziness of “resilience” 
can foster neoliberal ideologies, so too can ideas of pro-
gress: standing still would imply the death knell of a capi-
talist growth mentality. In addition, a linear perspective of 
the future as “a space of points and plotted trajectories” 
(Grove, 2016 p. 5) can have the effect of closing down 
choices and justifying particular forms of power—quite 
the opposite of a politics of possibility (Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger, 2007). In linear perspectives, Inayatullah 
(1993 p. 250) contends, “time is largely reductionist with 
efficiency as the primary goal”, and this risks legitimizing, 
as with “resilience”, a range of techno-managerial policy 
actions in the present.
However, there is also something of a tension between 
the Welsh Government’s progress-orientated narrative and 
the resilience narrative outlined in the previous section. 
While the former appears to strive to transform the world 
anew, the latter seeks to preempt and prepare for a future 
which is seemingly already determined. It is as though 
these two impulses pull in opposite directions along the 
same linear trajectory. This tension is compounded by a 
corresponding discourse of limits employed by the Welsh 
Government in relation to human–ecological relations. In 
its ambition to achieve the goal of “an innovative, produc-
tive and low carbon society which  recognizes the limits 
of the global environment and therefore uses resources 
efficiently and proportionately” (Department for Natural 
Resources of the Welsh Government, 2015 p. 5), as well 
as repeated references to “living within environmental 
limits”, the Welsh Government echoes wider discourses 
on environmental limits which have been influential in 
the environmental movement since the 1970s. Whereas 
Modern attitudes to progress celebrated the transcend-
ence of environmental limits, the environmental politics 
which emerged after the 1972 Club of Rome report, Limits 
to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), warned that growth was 
inescapably limited by the physical facts of existence, 
and urged that current trajectories of growth were no 
longer tenable. Despite recent efforts aligned with Green 
Modernity to re-vamp environmental politics to have a 
more forward-looking, optimistic feel rather than a con-
servative one (for example, the UN’s The World We Want 
project), an interest in environmental limits has resurfaced 
of late (Rickards et al., 2014), particularly associated with 
ideas such as planetary boundaries and safe operating 
spaces for humanity (Rockström et al., 2009). The Welsh 
Government, then, appears to be juggling two contrast-
ing imaginaries of transformation: one which encourages 
progress and innovation, and one which calls on society to 
reduce and limit itself.
While a preoccupation with progress and development 
can be criticized for some of its deleterious effects on both 
human and environmental life (in as much as these are 
pretenses under which capital “must” always grow), the 
“limits” narrative also comes in for some bad press. Latour 
(2008) argues that, paradoxically, the limits discourse 
risks paralyzing politics and curtailing people’s emotional 
responses to environmental crises. Beck (2010 p. 263) adds 
that the portrayal of limits leaves “citizens with nothing 
but gloomy asceticism [and] a terror of violating nature”, 
and that this fear and terror is manipulated for particu-
lar political ends. Indeed, the resilience narrative in many 
ways relies on the idea of environmental limits and the 
possibility of shocks in the form of environmental thresh-
olds being breached (Cooke, West, and Boonstra, 2016). 
Imaginaries of environmental limits that must be 
“pulled-back” from not only reinforce a particular con-
ception of linear time—that somehow ceasing to destroy 
the environment implies a stepping back in time, a 
reversion to a bygone era—but it may also compound 
an assumed separation and incompatibility between 
humans and environment. It is perhaps ironic that, just 
as societies are realizing how entangled humans and 
nonhumans really are (the concept of the Anthropocene 
signifies this, if nothing else), the limits discourse has 
come along and put the breaks on, urging us to believe 
that the solution to environmental problems lies in a 
kind of “re-separatization” of culture and nature. In other 
words, the notion of limits (and the reactionary discourse 
that often accompanies it) risks presupposing some kind 
of external environment from which humanity has the 
option of retreating, and therefore reinforces a nature–
culture binary (Latour, 2008) that does little to pro-
mote new (and more accurate) ways of conceptualizing 
 human-environment relations. 
The Welsh Government’s imaginaries and narratives of 
socioecological transformation are, therefore, somewhat 
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contradictory in terms of how they frame capacities for 
transformation. While the progress-oriented narrative 
seems to imply, or encourage, limitless human capacity 
to transform, the invocation of environmental limits risks 
creating a false separation between humans and environ-
ment, and a sense in which humans must back-track to 
a previous time when humans encroached less into the 
environmental realm. Perhaps, given this state of ten-
sion between backwards and forwards, this is why resil-
ience emerges as usefully ambiguous term in the Welsh 
Government’s narrative, capable of occupying this terrain 
as a relatively atemporal concept, alternating between 
progressive and conservative as required.
It is also useful to consider the kinds of imaginaries 
created by a linear conception of time more broadly. In 
particular, I am interested in the kinds of subjectivities 
created by linear time, and also how conceptions of lin-
ear time correspond to lived realities. Romanyshyn (1989) 
describes how linear perspective initially developed as a 
technique in Renaissance art, and subsequently moved off 
the canvas to become a pervasive “habit of mind” for west-
ern-Enlightenment societies. The perspective, he argues, 
is tightly bound to the emergence of technological worlds 
and to sociotechno-imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). 
In addition, he argues that the emergence of linear per-
spective was significant because it saw space organized 
according to vanishing points and located objects on the 
same plane, rather than the multiple perspectives evident 
in earlier Medieval art. Linear perspective is therefore one 
in which “the observer is positioned as a spectator outside 
the space thus represented” (Groves, 2016 p. 5). Thus, in 
linear time, subjects are always somewhat divorced from 
the future (the future is always “over there”). Finally, it is 
highly questionable whether a linear imaginary is capa-
ble of fostering the kinds of transformation needed, when 
a more nuanced and complex understanding of society 
and ecology—and transformation—are warranted (e.g. 
Prigogine and Stengers, 1997; Urry, 2005; Morton, 2010). 
Inayatullah suggests that what is needed is a “multiple 
theory of time and space” (1993 p. 249), and he points 
to the existence of other temporalities and metaphors of 
time, including cyclical, spiral, and decline, perspectives. 
Such “heterotemporality” (Klinke, 2013 p. 678)—the exist-
ence of multiple temporalities alongside one another—
affords a richer imagination of time and transformation 
and corresponds more closely with the lived experiences 
of people, that is, time which appears to go slowly or speed 
up, time which stands still, time which repeats (as in the 
routines of our daily lives), not to mention time which 
surprises. As such, lived time tends to be experienced as 
spiral and fractal, rather than linear (see Figure 2) and 
incorporates multiple objects of concern such as other 
people, places, and communities—an “interdependence 
of linked narratives spiralling on through time” (Groves, 
2016 p. 7). It is from within lived futures, rather than from 
abstracted perspectives on the future which flatten and 
linearize, Groves contends, that society will be better able 
to cope with uncertainty through relations of connection 
and attachment.
Conspiracies of optimism
My final line of enquiry into the Welsh Government’s soci-
oecological imaginaries concerns a particular “aesthetic” 
at the core of its politics. In particular I am interested 
in the visual representations used in its public commu-
nications, notably in relation to the recent Well-being of 
Future Generations Act (2015) and Environment (Wales) 
Act (2016). The Welsh  Government has employed what 
is perhaps best described as a decidedly “cheerful” visual 
approach to communications associated with these pieces 
of legislation: bold, primary or pastel colors, cartoon-
like symbols and stylized representations of people and 
places. Short videos designed to explain the Well-being of 
Future Generations Act and the Environment Act utilize 
cartoon graphics of happy, smiling people, a backdrop of 
lush green landscapes and blue skies, and a soundtrack 
of birdsong (Figure 3). The films pan along a left to right 
trajectory (akin to a platform computer game), thus link-
Figure 2: Diagrams of temporality. Illustrations of different conceptualizations of time, including abstracted and 
emptied versions that follow linear notions of time (top left and right), and a lived temporality that is spiral and fractal, 
incorporating multiple narratives at once. (Source: Groves, 2016 p. 8). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.315.f2
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ing them to the linear temporality described above. They 
are narrated by a female voice in a light-hearted, optimis-
tic tone, without complicated language. As mentioned, 
the WFGA video features a single protagonist, “Megan”, 
and follows the course of her life through a trajectory of 
birth, school, college, career, family, death, highlighting 
the challenges she may face in meeting her needs along 
the way—challenges which the Act is designed to address 
(such as poverty, climate change, health, and inequality). 
Notwithstanding an obvious need and desire to make 
such publications accessible to a wide spectrum of people, 
it is worth, I think, holding up these aesthetic choices to 
some closer scrutiny with regards to how they may shape 
imaginative capacities for transformation.
That the Welsh Government paints a decidedly rosy 
picture of the future is not especially unusual. As already 
mentioned, utopian stances towards the future are 
deemed by many as an essential motivating force for 
social transformation (e.g. Levitas, 2013), and is a tactic 
many future-focused organizations and programs seem to 
be employing. However, the Welsh Government’s decision 
to use simplified, cartoon images means that often the 
seriousness or scale of the challenge is somewhat glossed 
over. Climate change, amongst other socioecological con-
cerns, is presented as a mere problem to be dealt with 
along the (seemingly inevitable?) route towards a happy 
future. The Welsh Government’s proposals to deal with 
climate change can come across in rather vague terms. 
One section of the WFGA film shows a smiling Megan sit-
ting at school with a checklist written on the blackboard, 
with the title “Looking Ahead: Megan’s Needs”. The narra-
tor says:
So, over her life, Megan has many needs. The good 
news is that these needs can be met. However, there 
are a few challenges in the way. Such as: poverty; an 
increasingly global economy; an aging population; 
poor health; and the inequality of health between 
people; climate change, and pressures on our natu-
ral resources; and rising demand for quality public 
services.
And while this sounds straightforward, it fails to acknowl-
edge that the Welsh Government’s own targets on cli-
mate change (3% reduction per year), as mentioned, 
are nowhere near what has been deemed necessary if 
extremely dangerous changes in climate are to be averted. 
Similarly, little if anything is said about how socioeco-
logical crises are already effecting society—rather, they 
are presented as threats sometime in the future. This pre-
sents something of what Hirt (1996) calls a “conspiracy 
of optimism”—a situation in which the severity of the 
problem is masked by whoever is doing the representing. 
Latour (2015) finds this to be a widespread problem, and 
Figure 3: Screenshots from videos introducing the Well-being of Future Generations Act and the Environment 
(Wales) Act. Screenshots from videos used for public communication about the Well-being of Future Generations Act 
(top row) and the Environment (Wales) Act (bottom row). Both use cartoon images and pan from left to right to depict 
society moving towards an attractive, sustainable future in Wales. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.315.f3
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contends that never before in history has there been such 
a mismatch between the requirements of society and the 
“keep calm and carry on” approach coming from leaders. 
Similarly, Klein (2015 p. 3) observes how a tendency “to 
tell ourselves comforting stories about how humans are 
clever”—particularly in relation to technological “fixes”—is 
simply a version of climate denial, of “looking away”.
What are the emotional effects of obscuring from view, 
or watering down, the seriousness, loss and tragedy of the 
current socioecological predicament? What happens to 
imaginative capacities for transformation? One compel-
ling suggestion is that, contrary to an instinct to want to 
avoid pain or discomfort, confronting shared vulnerabili-
ties in the face of seemingly overwhelming environmental 
crises is a crucial element in processes of individual and 
collective transformation. As Macy and Johnstone (2012) 
explain, the result of not suffering, of not confronting the 
dystopian possibilities of the current situation, is apathy 
(meaning, literally, a- ‘without’ + pathos ‘suffering’). Other 
commentators have also noted the pitfalls of only focus-
ing on the good. Featherstone and Miles (2014 p. 128) 
remark that “it is only when we confront the worst, and 
understand that the way things are now cannot continue, 
that we realize that we must change our situation and 
invent the new”. Haraway (2016), too, believes that “stay-
ing with the trouble” necessarily involves the work of, as 
Kenney (2014 p. 255) puts it “inheriting violent pasts and 
presents in the process of building more livable worlds”. 
Dystopian imaginaries might be politically unpopular, 
but they might also be a way to empower individuals and 
political communities to take action to avert it (Claisse 
and Delvenne, 2015). This proposition resonates with the 
original meaning of the word “crisis”, which etymologically 
means the time to make decisions which could secure a 
turn for the better (Bauman, 1999). Today, the idea of 
“crisis” is more often associated with an atmosphere of 
impending disaster or catastrophe and feelings of uncer-
tainty and helplessness—another reason to want to avoid 
thinking about it.
The Welsh Government is therefore caught in a diffi-
cult place: too much talk and imagery of apocalypse risks 
depoliticizing issues like climate change as an uncontrol-
lable planetary inevitability, while too much utopianism 
risks preventing people from confronting pain and vul-
nerability, and thus invokes another kind of depoliticiza-
tion: apathy. This is a tension not easily resolved, and of 
course is not the job of government alone. Nonetheless, 
my analysis suggests that, in the Welsh Government’s 
approach, there is a trend towards an increasingly infan-
talized, sugar-coated approach to socioecological trans-
formation. The imagery and narratives employed in the 
recent videos create an aesthetic which belies the com-
plexity of both the problem and the solutions. Solutions 
are couched in relatively familiar, safe terms—“the cup-
cake as opposed to the messy and collapsing sponge-cake” 
(Whyman, 2014, unpaginated). This kind of response to a 
crisis is reactionary rather than transformative, shutting 
down possibilities thrown up by the crisis in favour of (re)
asserting certain values, and creating child-like subjects. 
Guattari ([1989] 2014 p. 33) vehemently opposes such 
a “stupifying and infantilizing consensus”, arguing that 
what is really needed in response to socioecological cri-
ses is dissensus, and a cultivation and openness to diverse 
possibilities.
Finally, the decision to use cartoons and playful graph-
ics to illustrate the most recent policy developments 
rather than photos of actual people or places (as was the 
case in earlier publications such as the One Wales: One 
Planet strategy (2009)) also raises some interesting ques-
tions about how imaginations of, and relations to, the 
future are constructed. On one hand, it is possible to 
understand why cartoons might have been chosen as rela-
tively neutral, easy-to-reproduce graphic representations 
which help to build a particular image and “brand” for the 
Welsh Government’s sustainability projects. On the other 
hand, I suggest that using cartoons, rather than photos 
of actual people and places, does two, related, things in 
terms of future imaginaries: first, and related to a linear 
perspective on time, it implies that the future is somewhat 
detached from the here and now, the “imagined future is a 
different world, inhabited not only by different technolo-
gies but inhabited by different people, too” (Nordmann, 
2014 p. 89). Second, this sense of “otherness” means that 
the future is essentially unrecognizable in the context of 
the present—there is little to suggest that things already 
happening in society are related to possible futures, or 
that problems like climate change are having or will have 
an effect on current environments and communities. It 
therefore reinforces an imaginary in which the future is 
abstracted, always somewhere ahead or “not-yet”, rather 
than a lived future which is inextricably part of the present 
(Groves, 2016). Chakrabarty (2009 p. 197) describes how 
“the current crisis can precipitate a sense of the present 
that disconnects the future from the past by putting such 
a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility”. The 
Welsh Government’s future is, in some respects, a “world 
without us” (Weisman, 2008), in that images of present-
day people and places are substituted by idealized cartoon 
forms. Similarly, Adam and Groves describe how contex-
tual, embedded and embodied futures-in-the-making can 
be “airbrushed from the picture, traversed and negated” 
(Adam and Groves, 2007 p. 14). The danger is that this 
kind of artistic license glosses over the real difficulties of 
transformative action (Harvey, 2000), and therefore that 
images “do not identify agencies and processes of change. 
The result is that utopia moves further into the realms of 
fantasy” (Levitas, 1993 p. 265). Although this might have 
the advantage of liberating the imagination from the con-
straint of what it is possible to imagine is possible, it has 
the disadvantage of severing utopia from recognizable 
processes of social change (Levitas, 1993).
Appealing to values
The ambiguities and tensions I have highlighted in this 
article may not necessarily prevent people engaging with 
the Welsh Government’s approach, and may in fact be part 
of the Government’s strategy to appeal to as wide a base 
as possible and to get citizens “on board” with its vision. 
For example, Verweij and Thompson (2006)  suggest that 
“clumsy solutions”–approaches to social and environ-
mental problems that combine different ways of organ-
izing–are more likely to be accepted precisely because 
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they are capable of appealing to multiple, often contradic-
tory, standpoints. Indeed, the vision the Government has 
crafted has been informed by detailed research that it com-
missioned in 2011, carried out by the Climate Outreach 
and Information Network (COIN). The resulting report 
(Marshall, 2014) detailed an approach to climate commu-
nications based around shared national identity in Wales, 
aimed at being inclusive and appealing to people’s sense 
of belonging. In particular, Welsh cultural values of mod-
est leadership and self-reliance were highlighted. Conse-
quently, much of the vocabulary, imagery, and narratives 
found in the Well-being of Future Generations Act and 
associated legislation such as the Environment (Wales) Act 
have been developed to appeal to these (and other) val-
ues. This attention to values is certainly something to be 
admired; the importance of constructing  narratives about 
environmental change that align with people’s existing 
values and worldviews—which are diverse even within 
one country—is increasingly recognized (e.g. Crompton, 
2010; Schwartz, 2012; Hedlund-de Witt, 2014). It has also 
been shown that catastrophic imagery regarding climate 
change is more likely to disempoewer and disengage pub-
lics than imagery that is more associated with solutions, 
and that this has important implications for imagining cli-
mate futures (O’Neill and Smith, 2013). However, there has 
been little research regarding the role of cartoons in the 
cultural politics of climate change. One exception (Manzo, 
2012) engages with climate change cartoons as forms of 
visual commentary (often satire), but this is rather dif-
ferent to the ways in which the Welsh Government has 
used cartoons to depict a positive future (within which, 
incidentally, there is very little visual reference to climate 
change itself). This would certainly be an area worthy of 
further research with regards to how well such cartoons 
engage and inspire people. 
However, even with successful take-up of the 
Government’s vision, the question remains–what kind of 
vision are people getting on board with, and is it likely to 
generate meaningful socioecological transformation? As 
Anderson (2009) contends, imaginaries provide the very 
grounds of possibility for transformation, and so exactly 
what the Welsh Government is envisioning matters. One 
concern—and this is a problem that applies to environ-
mental communication more widely—is that, in construct-
ing narratives that appeal only to existing values, there is 
little room for new and different values (of the sort that 
might be necessary for socioecological transformation) to 
emerge. For example, the notion of resilience seems to be 
used by the Welsh Government to appeal to people’s val-
ues of belonging and a desire to protect and preserve their 
communities against future threats. While this might be 
appealing to many people who feel somewhat threatened 
by processes of globalisation and change, it is a narra-
tive that risks stunting a more open imaginary of global 
interconnectedness and of openness to (as yet unknown) 
future possibilities. Similarly, the Government’s tendency 
to frame transformation as a profoundly temporal issue, 
with the future imagined as something “out there”, and 
“yet-to-come” (Groves, 2007 p. 1), is a familiar approach 
that is likely to resonate with many people’s sense of 
time and progress, but it could prevent more innovative 
approaches to transformation that more accurately reflect 
how change happens. As already discussed, linear tempo-
rality can have the effect of severing the future from the 
present and the past in our imaginations, creating atmos-
pheres of apathy of disengagement. It is also increasingly 
recognized that so-called “long-threats” created by sci-
entific knowledge of climate change (horizons of 2050, 
2100 and so on), are perceived by many to be so distant 
that they are not worth bothering about (Brace and 
Geoghegan, 2011 p. 290). Moreover, linear perspective 
risks creating subjects as observers and voyeurs outside of 
time, stripped of transformative agency. In light of this, 
some suggest that more contextualised, participatory, 
lived, futures-in-the-making (Adam and Groves, 2007; 
Falk 2016) address this problem of abstraction by under-
standing the present rather than the future as the object 
of transformation. Although this is quite an ontological 
leap for any Government to make, it may in fact be one 
that better matches individual’s own experiences of time 
and change which tend to be more immediate, complex, 
and non-linear. Perhaps this is also how the concept of 
resilience—as it is generally used by resilience theorists, to 
incorporate elements of non-linearity, emergence, uncer-
tainty—can be most helpful, as a means to potentially shift 
from purely temporal imaginaries, to those which incor-
porate something of the complex, diverse, lived, present.
The challenge, then, seems to be to find ways of using 
values-based approaches (in order to engage people ini-
tially), without reproducing narratives about time and 
change that—although comfortable—are unlikely to be 
sufficient for truly thinking and behaving differently with 
regard to our environmental predicament. This is the 
tension between seeking to connect with people where 
they are “now”, while also presenting radically alternative 
visions (and values) for the future. Perhaps it is possible 
to do both. There is nothing to say, for example, that the 
idea of lived futures is incompatible with commonly-held 
values such as belonging and community (two important 
values also identified in the COIN report). Indeed, many 
aspects of the Welsh Government’s vision (resilience, lin-
ear time, and unbridled optimism) that concern me in this 
article are aspects that could feasibly be altered to reflect 
more imaginative thinking about time and change, rather 
than falling back on classically “modern” imaginaries 
that—as I have argued—are no longer fit for purpose.
Good intentions, inadequate ideas?
If the notion of the Anthropocene signals, as Delanty and 
and Mota (2017) propose, a new cultural model which 
invokes new conceptions of time, agency, knowledge 
and governance, then the Welsh Government’s imagi-
naries of socioecological transformation present us with 
some insights into how such a model is currently taking 
shape. There is a complex interplay of forces that shape 
 futures-in-the-making, and in this short article I have 
only visited a few. Nonetheless, the themes of resilience, 
linear conceptions of time, and what I have referred to 
here as “conspiracies of optimism” (after Hirt, 1996), indi-
cate particular configurations of ideas that are relevant 
for considering transformation more widely. My analysis 
raises questions about the kinds of imaginative capaci-
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ties and subjectivities that are engendered by the Welsh 
 Government’s vision. Meaningful socioecological trans-
formation, amongst other things, is likely to require new 
 conceptions of human progress, of human-environment 
relations, and of “the future” as something which is actively 
created in the present, not a point on a timeline to be 
aimed for or anticipated. These are ideas which are largely 
lacking in the Welsh Government’s imaginaries, although—
given the wider political context and a desire to appeal to 
voters—it is understandable why this might be so. 
It is increasingly suggested that there is a “crisis” in imag-
ination when it comes to socioecological transformation 
(e.g. Buell, 1996; Cheney, 1999; Yusoff and Gabrys, 2011; 
Wapner, 2016; Magrane, 2017). Harvey (2000) and Levitas 
(2013), for example, have written at length about a dearth 
of collective imagination that has resulted in a feeling 
that “there is no alternative” (Harvey, 2000 p. 17) to social, 
political and economic conditions. More specifically, 
Wapner (2016), uses the idea of “Climate Inc.” to describe 
a situation in which responses to climate change seem 
to be marked by a distinct lack of imagination, revolving 
only around narrow, hegemonic scientific and economic 
explanations about what is possible (see also Wainwright 
and Mann, 2013). Such hegemony closes down the imagi-
native space necessary to think otherwise about environ-
mental crises, and to create alternative ways of organizing 
(Harris 2017b). As Gerlach points out, with reference to 
the Ecuadorian government’s 2008 strategic plan called 
“Buen Vivir” (“living well”), good intentions can risk 
becoming inadequate ideas if they are appropriated in the 
name of technocracy (Gerlach, 2017 p. 4). I see the Welsh 
Government’s efforts in a similar light; its Well-being of 
Future Generations Act is full of good intention but often 
its imaginaries are inadequate for helping people—psy-
chologically and practically—respond to the complex soci-
oecological challenges of the 21st Century. Nonetheless, 
my aim in this article has been to begin to open up space 
for discussion about the Welsh Government’s approach, 
in the hope that the seemingly unquestionable might be 
questioned, and more diverse socioecological imaginar-
ies considered. The Welsh Government is itself constantly 
revising its approaches to sustainability (from the original 
constitutional commitment in Government of Wales Act 
in 1998, to the WFGA in 2015), and these constitutional 
foundations could provide an excellent “nursery” for 
experimental ideas. Perhaps then, with a little more imag-
ination, the Welsh Government’s aspirations to develop 
genuinely innovative environmental policy might yet be 
fulfilled. 
Notes
 1 An overview is available at http://www.futurejustice.
org/resources/global-view-of-mechanisms-recognis-
ing-future-generations/. Last accessed 3 July 2017.
 2 http://www.futureearth.org/our-vision. Last accessed 
3 July 2017.
 3 Available at http://gov.wales/topics/people-and-
communities/people/future-generations-act/future-
generations-act-video/?lang=en. Last accessed 4 July 
2017.
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